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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
KENWORTH SALES COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, doing business in the 
state of Idaho,
Plaintiff/Petitioner/Respondent Supreme Court Docket No: 45883
vs.
Twin Falls County No. CV42-16-2539
SKINNER TRUCKING, INC., an Idaho 
corporation;
JAMES E. SKINNER, an individual; and 
DAVID C. SKINNER, an individual;
Defendants/Appellant
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls.
Flonorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge Presiding.
Bren E. Mollerup
Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollerup, PLLC
126 2nd Ave. North
PO Box 366
Twin Falls, ID 83301
mollerup@benoitlaw.com
Attorney for Kenworth Sales Company
Joe Rockstahl
Rockstahl Law Office, Chtd. 
510 Lincoln St.
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
service@ioerockstahl.com




Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Please see the Statement of the Case section found in Appellant’s initial brief.
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
Please see the Additional Issues on Appeal section found in Appellant’s initial brief.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Please see the Standard of Review section found in Appellant’s initial brief.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Matter of Costs Does Not Lack Ripeness
Ken worth claims that the matter of costs lacks ripeness on appeal. Res. Mem. 5.
Appellant disagrees. Ripeness is one element that must be satisfied for there to be a live case or
controversy appropriate for judicial review. Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 317, 92 P.3d
1063, 1064 (2002). “Ripeness asks whether there is any need for court action at the present
time.” Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 642, 778 P.2d 757, 764 (1989).
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when ruling that each party shall
bear their own costs. (Vol. 1, p. 193.). When examining whether a district court abused its
discretion, this Court considers whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently within the
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Shore v.
Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009).
The matter of costs is still ripe because the trial court abused its discretion when it chose
to deny Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration and attorneys’ fees under I.R.C.P 68 in the
Corrected Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider and Partially
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Please see the Statement 0f the Case section found in Appellant’s initial brief.
II. O SU
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Granting Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, issued on March 13, 2018. (Vol. 1,
p. 208). Even though the Trial Court did grant costs in this case under I.R.C.P. 54(d), stating,
“.. .under Masters, a prevailing party may receive justified costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d) (citations
omitted), these costs have been briefed, but not argued in court. (Vol. 1, p. 208).
The issue of costs is still ripe, as the trial court abused its discretion and the hearing to
determine costs has yet to be held as Judge Shindurling ordered. In addition, as both parties have
now filed appeals, costs for both parties will grow and the issue will need to be addressed as the
case progresses.
B. Skinner is Entitled to Fees Under I.C. §12-120(3)
Kenworth claims that Appellant continues to misunderstand the law under I.C. §12-
120(3). Kenworth first argues that I.C. §12-120(3) does not entitle a party to fees based solely
on the existence of a commercial transaction tangentially related to the case. Res. Mem. p. 6.
Appellant's understand this point. Appellant is not arguing that the the commercial transaction is
tangentially related to the case, but instead that a commercial transaction existed between the
parties (emphasis added). Contrary to Kenworth’s assertion, there is evidence in the record of a
commercial transaction between the parties.
Kenworth further argues, “The fact that there was no commercial transaction between
Respondent and the Appellants upon which the Respondent’s claim for relief was based is
dispositive under the statute.” Res. Mem. p. 7. Appellant disagrees. Kenworth is arguing that
because they themselves did not include an element in their own claim for relief, Appellant
should be unable to make the assertion in the case. There is no relative case law to support this
assertion.
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Appellant argues that since a commercial transaction did exist between the parties, even
with the absence of a contract, attorney fees should be granted under Idaho Code §12-120(3).
C. Skinner is Entitled to Fees Under I.C. §12-121
Kenworth asserts that their case was not pursued frivolously, citing the Trial Court’s
decision that Kenworth had a good faith, factual basis for their suit. Res. Mem. p. 9. Appellant
understands that a denial of fees under I.C. §12-121 is only reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Lowery v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs for Ada Cty., 115 Idaho 64, 68, 764 P.2d 431, 435 (Ct. App.
1988). Appellants believe that the Trial Court did abuse its discretion when it found that
Kenworth did not pursue the case frivolously. As found in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, Kenworth purchased the trucks from GE at the full residual value. (Vol 1, p. 128.)
Kenworth did not enrich the Appellants in the form of debt relief or otherwise. Id, Therefore,
Kenworth’s attempt to demand the return value of the gifted payments was unwarranted and
resulted in needless litigation. Kenworth was only trying to save its relationship with Defendants
at the time.
Therefore, if the Court somehow denies an award of fees under Rule 68 and Section §12-
120(3), the Court should still award Defendants their fees under §12-121 for having to defend
against an unfounded lawsuit.
D. Skinner is Entitled to Fees Under I.R.C.P. 68
Kenworth argues that Appellant’s claim for fees under Rule 68 should be denied because
I.R.C.P. 68 is not a basis for fees under Idaho law. Res. Mem. p. 9. Kenworth cites to Vnlk v.
Haley, which states, “Rule 68 is intended to protect a defendant against a plaintiffs claim for
costs where the defendant has made a reasonable offer of judgment and where the verdict
recovered by the plaintiff is less favorable than the offer. Rule 68 does not include attorney fees.”
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Vulkv. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 859, 736 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1987). However, the issue of attorney
fees under Rule 68 has been interpreted differently since this 1987 case. For example, in
Czerwinsky v, Lieske, the Idaho Court of Appeals held, “For purposes of Rule 68, the offer of
judgment is “deemed to include all claims recoverable including any attorneys fees allowable by
contract or the law and costs then accrued.” Czerwinsky v. Lieske, 122 Idaho 96, 99, 831 P.2d
564, 567 (Ct. App. 1992), citing to I.R.C.P. 68 (emphasis added). The Court in Czerwinsky did
not award attorneys fees in that case, but only did not do so because the Trial court had
determined not to award fees and therefore they couldn’t be included in the judgment to be
weighed against the offer. Id.
Here, Appellant is entitled to attorneys fees under §12-120 and §12-121, which therefore
indicates that Appellant is entitled to attorneys fees and costs under I.R.C.P. 68.
V. FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
Please see the Fees and Costs on Appeal section found in Appellant’s initial brief.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the Trial Court’s decision
to deny reasonable attorney’s fees under I.R.C.P. 68,1.C. §12-120(3), and I.C. §12-121, be
reversed and attorney’s fees and costs be awarded to Appellant. In addition, Appellant
respectfully requests that the Trial Court’s decision to grant costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d) be upheld.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2018.
ROCKSTAHL LAW OFFICE, CHTD.
JOE ROCKSTAHL
Attorney for Defendants/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of August, 2018,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF to be served upon the following attorney(s) in the
following manner:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents
Bren E. Mollerup 
Michael D. Danielson
Benoit, Alexander, Harwood, High & Mollerup, PLLC
126 2nd Ave. North
PO Box 366
Twin Falls, ID 83301
mollerup@benoitlaw.com
danielson@benoitlaw.com
[ ] First Class Mail 
[X] iCourt eFile 




JOE RjOCKSTAHL or Legal Assistant
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